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Abstract: We argue that Ireland experienced a great depression in the 1980s comparable 
in severity to the better known and more studied depression episodes of the interwar 
period. Using the business cycle accounting framework of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 
(2005), we examine the factors that lead to the depression and the subsequent recovery in 
the 1990s. We calculate efficiency, labor, investment and government wedges, and 
evaluate the contribution of each to the downturn and subsequent recovery. We find that 
the efficiency wedge on its own can account for a significant portion of the downturn, but 
predicts a stronger recovery in output. The labor wedge also helps account for what 
happened during the depression episode. We also find that the investment wedge played 
no role in the depression. 
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Ireland’s impressive economic performance during the 1990s attracted global 
attention. The facts are by now well known. Per capita GDP increased from around 60 
percent of the EU average at the beginning of the decade to more than 100 percent by the 
end of the decade. Rapid GDP growth was accompanied by dramatic declines in the 
unemployment rate. Ireland went from having one of the highest unemployment rates in 
the EU in the middle of the 1980s to one of the lowest by the turn of the century. 
Between 1987 and 2000, non-agricultural employment in Ireland increased about 45 
percent, with almost all of the jobs being generated in the private sector. The most 
dramatic job gains came after 1994: from 1994 to 2000, approximately half a million new 
jobs were generated (almost all of them in the business sector), compared with zero net 
employment creation during the first 70 years of the state’s existence.
1 Ireland’s 
performance during the second half of the 1990s was so impressive that it came to be 
referred to as the “Celtic Tiger.” 
Many reasons have been put forward for the impressive performance of the Irish 
economy during the 1990s, with particular attention being paid to the favorable corporate 
income tax regime, the availability of a high-skilled low wage workforce, and tariff-free 
access to the markets of the European Union. Between 1986 and 1997, the top marginal 
rate of personal income tax fell by some 10 percentage points, while the basic rate of 
corporate income tax fell by 12 percentage points. Low rates of corporate taxation, along 
with free access to the European market, made Ireland an attractive location for US firms 
seeking access to the European market. According to a recent OECD study, Ireland has 
fewer restrictions on FDI than any other OECD country except the UK.
2 Furthermore, the 
reduction in restrictions since 1980 has been greater than in almost any other OECD 
country. And there has been an extraordinary influx of foreign firms over the past decade 
and a half, with most major US technology companies having important production 
plants in Ireland. A component of the FDI story is that the granting of free access to 
second-level education in the late 1960s meant that the country had a labor force with the 
                                                           
1 According to Meenan (1970), the number of people “gainfully employed” in 1926 was 1.304 million. In 
1961, the number was 1.052 million. According to recent OECD data total employment did not exceed the 
level of 1926 until 1996. 
2 See OECD Economic Outlook No. 73, 2003. 
  1appropriate skill mix for foreign investors. Walsh (2000) argues that all of the factors 
mentioned above played an important role in creating the Celtic Tiger, and further that 
“we cannot establish the relative importance of each.” (Walsh, 2000, p. x)  The papers in 
the volume edited by Barry (1999) are a represent major attempts to account for what 
happened and why.  
A somewhat different perspective on the 1990s boom is provided by Honohan and 
Walsh (2003). The essence of the Honohan and Walsh thesis is that the boom of the 
1990s was nothing more than delayed convergence. We summarize our interpretation of 
the Honohan and Walsh in Figure 1. Honohan and Walsh identify 1973 as a key date in 
Irish macroeconomic history, noting that “…in 1973 an optimist could – and some did – 
foresee a steady convergence in living standards to reach those of the United Kingdom 
and other advanced European economies within a generation…Indeed, the situation at the 
end of the twentieth century can be seen as the fulfillment of that prediction.” (Honohan 
and Walsh, 2002, p.4) They go on to note “The whole period since 1973 thus appears as a 
long business cycle, with a deep and prolonged trough in the first half of the 1980s and a 
climacteric around end-century.” (Honohan and Walsh, 2002, p.7)  Figure 1 shows the 
deviation of (the log of) GDP per head of working age (15-64) population (measured in 
millions of 1995 euro) from a deterministic trend fitted to the same series over the 1960-
73 period.
3 GDP per head of the working age population grew at an average annual rate 
of 3.6 percent over the period from 1960 to 1973. In 1973, GDP per head of working age 
population was 0.8 of one percent above trend. Growth slowed substantially following 
the first oil price shock in 1973, and was further derailed after a brief growth spurt in 
1977 and 1978 by the second oil shock in 1979.  
The severity and duration of the downturn that followed the two oil shocks 
qualifies it as a “great depression” according to Kehoe and Prescott (2002). Kehoe and 
Prescott propose two criteria for classifying a cyclical episode as a great depression: 
1. First, the downturn must be sufficiently severe. Kehoe and Prescott adopt a 
working definition of severity as a decline of at least 20 percent below trend. 
                                                           
3 See Data Appendix for data sources and variable definitions.  
  22. Second, the decline must be rapid. Kehoe and Prescott adopt a working 
definition of rapidity as a decline of at least 15 percent below trend within the first decade 
of the episode.  
We see that the Irish episode satisfies both of these criteria. By 1983, GDP per 
head of working age population was 15.5 percent below trend. By 1988, GDP per head of 
working age population was 22.3 percent below trend, and in 1993 bottomed out at 23.5 
percent below trend. The rapid growth of the 1990s brought output back to its trend level 
by 2002. We should note here that the Kehoe and Prescott definition of a depression does 
not require that the economy return to its pre-depression trend path. They allow for the 
possibility that changes in institutions during the course of a depression may permanently 
lower the level of total factor productivity. This does seem to have been the case in 
Ireland. While the Irish episode does not quite match the US Great Depression in severity 
(Cole and Ohanian (1999) report that output in the US was only 61.7 percent of its trend 
level at the trough of the Great Depression in 1933), it surpasses it in length. Indeed, none 
of the depression episodes studied in the Kehoe and Prescott volume are as long as the 
near 30 cycle that Ireland experienced. 
We should also note here that Kehoe and Prescott define trend in terms of the 
long run growth rate of the US economy. Over the twentieth century, GDP per head of 
working age population has grown at an average annual rate of about 2%. The choice of 
this benchmark is justified in terms of the US representing the frontier of what is 
available to all countries, absent “barriers to riches.” Use of the 2% figure is probably 
reasonable for countries that were relatively rich at the beginning of their great 
depression episodes (such as the New Zealand and Switzerland episodes studied by 
Kehoe and Ruhl (2003, 2005)). However, Ireland was arguably still in the process of 
converging to the frontier when its great depression episode began. Figure 2 shows 
Ireland’s per capita GDP relative to the US since 1920. Note that Ireland remained pretty 
constant at about 42 percent of the US level throughout the 1950s. The opening of the 
economy in the late 1950s and early 1960s arguably put the economy on a convergence 
trajectory. This is a key part of the story of Honohan and Walsh, and we will assume a 
high rate of trend growth in the quantitative exercises below.  
  3Viewed from a great depression perspective, what happened during the Celtic 
Tiger boom years of the 1990s was simply a recovery from a very severe downturn. 
There is a well documented and seemingly robust relationship between the severity of 
downturns and the strength of the subsequent recoveries. Milton Friedman (1969) was 
one of the first to show that, while the strength of expansions bears little relation to the 
severity of the subsequent contractions, the severity of a contraction does seem to 
correlate with the strength of subsequent expansions. Specifically, the more severe the 
recession, the stronger the subsequent recovery. Wynne and Balke (1992) and Balke and 
Wynne (1996) showed further using data on industrial production and the NBER’s 
chronology of US business cycles that what matters most is not the depth or length of a 
recession, but the cumulative output loss, and that most of the impact was in the first 
twelve months of the recovery.  
  The basic neoclassical growth model provides a useful framework for thinking 
about what happened in Ireland over the past 30 years, and quantifying the relative 
importance of various factors identified by previous authors. In recent years a number of 
authors have sought to understand various depression and recovery episodes using this 
model. Cole and Ohanian (1999) is a pioneering contribution in this regard. They 
explored the implications of the neoclassical model for what happened in the United 
States during the Great Depression of 1929-33. They found that the basic model driven 
by productivity shocks can account for much of the severity of the decline in activity 
during the Depression, but has trouble accounting for what happened during the recovery. 
In subsequent research, Cole and Ohanian (2001) show that New Deal cartelization 
policies that limited competition and enhanced the bargaining power of unions can 
account for a significant fraction (about half) of the sluggish recovery from the 1929-33 
downturn. 
  More recently Kehoe and Prescott (2002) edited a special issue of Review of 
Economic Dynamics devoted to trying to account for various great depressions in 
different countries using this model. In addition to examining the interwar depressions in 
Canada, the US, the UK, France, Italy and Germany, contributors to the volume also 
considered the more recent depression experiences of Argentina, Mexico, Chile and 
Japan. While the factors driving the downturns and recoveries differed from case to case 
  4(for example, generous unemployment benefits in the case of the UK, trade restrictions in 
the case of Italy, a deceleration of TFP in the case of Japan), the neoclassical growth 
model provides a unifying framework for thinking about the various depression episodes. 
Prescott (2002) used the basic model to account for differences in economic performance 
around the world. Prescott finds that France’s low level of output per capita relative to the 
United States can be accounted for by the greater (tax) distortion of the tradeoff between 
consumption and leisure. Japan’s depressed level of activity reflects less efficient 
production.  
  The power of this model to account for observed phenomena is clear. And if 
further justification were needed, we note Honohan and Walsh’s observation that “…to 
the extent that the whole period represents a single observation or cycle, it limits the kind 
of econometric work that can be done on the broad time series characteristics…” 
(Honohan and Walsh, 2002, 11). This makes the neoclassical growth model an ideal 
econometric tool for studying this episode. 
 
Wedges 
In what follows we will use this model to do a basic business-cycle accounting 
exercise to illustrate the power of the neoclassical model to account for what happened in 
Ireland between 1973 and 2002. We will do this by estimating various “wedges” that 
could contribute to the downturn and subsequent recovery, and quantify the relative 
importance of each.  
To understand what we mean by wedges, consider the basic labor market 
efficiency condition that in equilibrium the marginal rate of substation between 
consumption and leisure (MR ) will be equated to the (after tax) marginal product of 
labor ((1 ): 
S
)MPL τ −
   (1)  (1 ) MRS MPL τ =−
As Hall (1997) and Mulligan (2000) point out, almost any reasonable macroeconomic 
model will imply an equilibrium condition of this sort. The wedge term, (1 , could be 
a tax on labor income, but could also reflect taxes on consumption, or other labor or 
product market distortions.  
) τ −
  5For example, if all taxes are levied on consumption at the rate   and there are no 
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which can be rewritten in the form of the labor market equilibrium condition by defining 
. With both consumption and labor income taxes, at the rates   and 
 similar manipulations will give us the basic equilibrium condition with 
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As another example, consider an economy where final output is produced using a 
finite number of intermediate inputs that are not perfect substitutes for one another.
4 
These intermediate goods are produced using capital and labor via a standard constant-
returns-to-scale technology. Some algebra shows that in such an economy the labor 
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where  () ( ) 1/ en n εε ≡− − , and   denotes the elasticity of substitution between 
various intermediate goods in producing final output, and n  denotes the number of 
intermediate goods producers. Government policy that restricts entry into the 
intermediate goods producing sector will keep n  below its optimal level. Elimination of 
restrictions on entry will allow n  to rise to its equilibrium level, which will be reflected 
in a decline in the wedge, since  . 
1 ε >
() 0 en ′ >
                                                          
  Hall (1997) and Mulligan (2002) construct measures of this wedge and examine 
its ability to account for employment fluctuations in the US. Hall interprets his estimate 
of the wedge as a shock to preferences (the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure), and finds that it accounts for a large fraction of the movements 
in hours in the US, with technology shocks playing only a minor role. Mulligan (2002) 
constructs time series for the wedge back to the nineteenth century, and finds that it 
correlates well with marginal tax rates at low frequencies.  
 
4 Foe more detail on this example, see Wu and Zhang (2000). 
  6  However, the labor-leisure or labor-consumption margin is not the only one that 
can be distorted by government policy. Regulation and taxation may also distort 
intertemporal margins, the willingness and ability of households and firms to substitute 
intertemporally. Government policy may also cause the economy to produce off the 
production possibility frontier. Wedges may also arise due to frictions of one sort or 
another that are due to factors other than government policy. 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) propose using the standard neoclassical 
growth model to measure these wedges or distortions and quantify the relative 
importance of each in accounting for fluctuations in economic activity. Specifically, they 
start with prototypical neoclassical economy where households have preferences defined 
over per capita consumption, C , and leisure, L : 










where   is the discount factor and N  denotes population. Households maximize (4) 
subject to a budget constraint 
β
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where   denotes the tax rate on purchases of new investment goods, X denotes 
purchases of new investment goods (again, in per capita terms),   denotes the tax on 
labor income,   denotes the real wage, H  denotes hours supplied to market production, 
 denotes the return in capital, K  denotes capital available for production during the 
period (also per capita), and T  denotes per capita transfer payments to or from the 
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where   denotes the gross rate of growth of the population and   denotes the 
depreciation rate. Households are endowed with one unit of time each period, so 
. Firms operate a technology for converting capital and labor inputs into final 
output and maximize  
N g δ
1 LH +=
  ( ) , t t tt tt tt AF K ZH wH rK −−  (7) 
  7where technical progress is assumed to be labor augmenting at the gross rate  : 
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  The equilibrium of this prototypical economy is then given by the resource 
constraints 
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where Y  denotes per capita output and G  denotes per capita government consumption, 
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On the basis of the equations defining the equilibrium of this prototype model, Chari, 
Kehoe and McGrattan propose four measures of wedges or distortions: An efficiency 
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an investment wedge defined (implicitly) by the intertemporal efficiency condition  
( ) (1 ) ,1
X
tCt t UC H τ +− =
( ) ( )
1
11 1 11 ,1 , (1 )(1 )
t
tCt t tK t t t EU C H AF K Z H β
+
++ + ++ ⎡ −+ ⎢ ⎣ 1
X δ τ + ⎤ − + ⎥ ⎦  (15) 
and a government consumption wedge defined implicitly by the aggregate resource 
constraint (8).  
It is clear that what is termed the efficiency wedge in this economy resembles 
total factor productivity, while the labor (or intratemporal) and investment wedges 
resemble taxes on labor income and investment. The government consumption wedge 
acts just like (unproductive) government spending in most macro models. However, as 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) show, the wedges in this prototype economy can 
  8reflect a much wider range of shocks or distortions than changes in productivity, taxes or 
government purchases.
5  
For the purposes of thinking about the applicability of the Chari, Kehoe and 
McGrattan business cycle accounting procedure to the Irish case, it is worth illustrating 
how various open economy models map into their prototype economy. Consider first the 
following standard small open economy model. Household preferences are given by  
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where notation is as before and we abstract from population growth. The household’s 
budget constraint is given by  
   (17)  () , tt t t t CXJF K H r B ++ = + t
t t J + +
t t FKH C J r B −−=−
where we have consolidated the firm’s problem into the household problem. Notation is 
as before and we assume there is no government and no technical progress. J  denotes 
purchases of foreign bonds (foreign investment) and rB  denotes earnings on holdings of 
foreign capital, with r  denoting the foreign (world) real interest rate and   denoting 
holdings of foreign assets. Foreign asset holdings evolve according to  . 
We assume that the economy is small in the sense that it takes the world real interest rate 
as given, and we further assume that  . The other constraints on the 
household’s problem are as before. Net exports in this economy will be equal to 
.  
B
1 t BB =
(1 ) 1 r β +=
() , tt t t X
  Compare this economy to a similar economy that is identical in all respects except 
that it is closed and there is a government that purchases some portion of final output, 
financing its purchases by means of lump sum taxes without having to resort to any form 
of distortionary taxation. The resource constraint in this economy is given by 
  ( ) , ttt t CXGF K H ++= t
t − )
                                                          
 (18) 
If we let the government consumption wedge in the closed economy be given by 
 where (,  denote 
equilibrium allocations in the small open economy, the allocations in the prototype closed 
() ,
SOE SOE SOE SOE
tt t t GF KH C X =− , ,
S O ES O ES O ES O E CHXK
 
5 Note that time varying taxes on consumption spending would distort both the intratemporal and 
intertemporal margins. 
  9economy will be identical, since the first order conditions will be the same in the two 
economies. This is the sense in which net exports in the detailed small open economy 
map into the government consumption wedge in the prototype economy.  
Consider next the following open economy example from Crucini and Kahn 
(2003). Consider a small open economy where households have preferences defined over 
a non-traded consumption-investment good,  , traded consumption goods, some of 
which are produced domestically,  , while others are imported,  , and leisure as 
before.  Households allocate time to the production of the nontraded good,  , the 
domestic tradable,  , material inputs (which are traded),  , and leisure, subject to 
the constraint 1 . Each good is produced by means of a 
Leontief technology combining materials inputs and a composite of capital and labor 
services,  . Preferences are given by  
N C
T C * T C
N H
T H M H
0
t L κ
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where the composite consumption good  []
1
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γγ γ γ − −− − =+ + .  
The representative firm in this economy chooses inputs to maximize 
   (20)  ii i M Yw Hr Kp M −− − i
i Y
=
subject to the production function, taking as given the prices of labor and capital services, 
 and r , and the price of intermediate inputs,  . With the fixed intermediate input 
given by  , we can rewrite this as  
w M p
i M θ =
   (21)  (1 ) Mi i i pY w H r K θ −− −
We assume that in addition to being a price taker in domestic factor markets, the 
representative firm is also a price taker in the world market for intermediate inputs. The 
domestic price of intermediate inputs (in terms of domestic output) is   
where   denotes the world price of material inputs and   denotes the domestic ad 
valorem equivalent tariff on imports of intermediate goods.  
* (1 )
M




The first order conditions for labor and capital are then  
   (22)  (1 ) ( , ) MK pFK H r θ −
and 
  10   (23)  (1 ) ( , ) MH pFK H w θ −=
α
                                                          
Comparing these conditions with the comparable conditions in the prototype 
economy, it should be clear that fluctuations in the domestic tariff on imports of 
intermediate inputs or changes in the world price of these inputs will correspond to 
changes in the efficiency wedge in the prototype economy. What if the tariff were 
imposed on imports of final consumption goods rather than intermediate inputs? The 
tariff will again show up in the efficiency wedge, but will not result in an observable 
labor wedge, since it will simply lower the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution 
between labor and consumption will be equal to the new marginal product of labor.  
 
Measurement  
To measure the various wedges we need to specify functional forms for 
preferences and production, and assign values to the model’s parameters. We employ the 
standard Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function 
, and assume that capital’s share is   = 0.35. We assume that 
the utility function take the log form   and that the time 
allocation parameter ψ = 1.5. We set the discount factor    = 0.97 and assume δ = 0.08. 
Our specifications for preferences and technology are the same as those employed by 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) in their study of US business cycles, and also by 
Chakraborty (2005) and Kobayashi and Inaba (2005) in their studies of Japanese cycles. 
The trend rates of growth,   and  , are set equal to 1.036 and 1.006 respectively.
1 (, ) ( ) FKZ H K Z H
α − = α
(,) l o g l o g UCL C L ψ =+
β
Z g N g
6
  Give these estimates of the various wedges, how well can we account for what 
happened in Ireland in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s? More specifically, which of these 
 
6 The choice of values for most of these parameters is relatively uncontroversial. If we try to estimate α 
using data from OECD national accounts as the ratio of compensation of employees to GDP, we would get 
a value for α of around 0.55. However, such an estimate may underestimate labor income in small firms, 
and as Gollin (2002) has shown, when properly measured, the share of labor in national income ranges 
between 0.65 and 0.80 in most countries, implying a range of values for α of between 0.35 and 0.2. We 
also assume a relatively high rate of trend productivity growth. Recall that we estimate that the trend rate of 
growth of GDP per head of working age population during the 1960-73 period was 3.6 percent. Using data 
from the OECD Outlook database for the Irish business sector we estimate a trend rate of growth of TFP 
from 1970 to 2004 of 3.8 percent (the number is only slightly lower of we use a the higher value for α 
suggested by the OECD National Accounts. By way of comparison, Maddison (1995) (Table 3-13b) 
estimates that labor productivity grew at an average annual rate of 4.3 percent between 1950 and 1973, and 
4.1 percent between 1973 and 1991.  
  11wedges accounts for the long bust and boom that Ireland experienced? Figure 3 shows 
our estimate of per capita GDP relative to trend (solid line), along with the movements in 
GDP predicted by each of the four wedges considered in isolation (dashed line), while 
Figures 4 and 5 shows the predicted movements of the labor input and investment.  By 
construction, the four wedges will account for all of the movements in GDP. We take 
1973 as the peak year - in an earlier draft of this paper we took 1978 as the starting point. 
Our choice of 1973 as the starting point of the cyclical episode is motivated by our 
reading of Honohan and Walsh. GDP per head of working age population was less than 
0.8 of percentage point from its (1960-73) trend that year.  
Starting with the top left panel of Figure 3, we see that the efficiency wedge on 
its own can do a good job of accounting for the downturn in output from 1973 through 
1983 or 1984. However, the efficiency wedge on its own would have predicted a 
bottoming out of GDP about 15 percent below trend in 1986, followed by a steady 
recovery that would have taken GDP back to trend by 1997. Note that the labor wedge in 
isolation would have predicted a more severe downturn in output than in fact occurred, 
with output dropping about 30 percent below trend by the late 1990s. Note also that the 
labor wedge in isolation does not generate the recovery that we see in the data from the 
mid 1990s forward. Finally, note that the government and investment wedges cannot 
account for the downturn and recovery. The government wedge would have predicted 
growth essentially along trend, while the investment wedge would have predicted a boom 
through the early 1980s, followed by a period of growth along essentially a higher path.  
Given the amount of attention paid to the growth in employment during the 1990s 
in Ireland, we decided to examine the predictions of our model for the labor input. Figure 
4 shows the predictions of the prototype model for the labor input when we allow each of 
the wedges to vary in isolation. Note that we use a more comprehensive measure of the 
labor input than employment alone: we measure the labor input in terms of aggregate 
hours worked in the market economy relative to the total number of hours available (see 
Data Appendix for details of our definition.) By our measure, the total amount of effort 
supplied to market production in Ireland fell after 1973, and has still not fully recovered. 
Starting again at the top left panel, note now that the efficacy wedge in isolation would 
have predicted that labor would have remained close to its trend level rather than 
  12declining by more than 20 percent between 1973 and the early 1990s. The government 
wedge and investment wedge would both have predicted a surge in the labor input of 
varying degrees rather than the decline that was actually experienced. Only the labor 
wedge generates a decline in the labor input, albeit more severe than the actual decline.  
Figure 5 shows the path of investment over the course of the depression and 
recovery along with the paths predicted by each of the wedges in isolation. Note that we 
estimate that investment was nearly 50 percent below trend by the early 1990s and was 
still well below trend in 2002.
7 The investment wedge in isolation would have generated 
a boom in investment, while the efficiency, labor and government wedges all generate 
declines in investment comparable to some degree to what we see in the data. 
It is interesting to compare the results for the long cycle of the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s with a shorter cyclical episode that might be considered less pathological. The Irish 
economy experienced a downturn in the mid 1960s. GDP per head of working age 
population was essentially equal to its trend value in 1965 and then declined to about 3 
percent below trend in 1966 before recovering to trend by 1969. Figures 6, 7 and 8 repeat 
the exercise shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5 for this shorter and milder cyclical episode. We 
now see that the efficiency wedges and the labor wedge both would have predicted a 
downturn in activity in 1966 and 1967. Note however that whereas the efficiency wedge 
then predicts a recovery in 1968 and 1969, the labor wedge predicts a persistent drop on 
output relative to trend. Indeed, the efficiency wedge on its own can effectively account 
for all of the 1965-68 cycle. The government and investment wedges would have 
generated growth above trend rather than downturns. When we look at the predictions for 
the labor input, we see that the efficiency, labor and government wedges all would have 
generated a decline in 1966 and 1967. The efficiency and government wedges have the 
labor input recovering by 1969, whereas the labor wedge generates a persistent decline in 
the labor input. And once again, the investment wedge generates movements in the 
wrong direction.  
So one robust result from this exercise is that the investment wedge does not seem 
to matter for the behavior of output, investment  and the labor input in either of the 
                                                           
7 See Data Appendix for our definition of investment. We include purchases of consumer durables in our 
definition of investment and exclude tem from our measure of consumption. 
  13cyclical episodes that we look at, in the sense that in both episodes the investment wedge 
acting in isolation would have predicted output growth above trend rather than below. 
This is similar to what Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan find for the Great Depression in the 
US and the 1982 downturn. They conclude that distortions manifested in the investment 
wedge played essentially no role in the Great Depression, and at best a modest role in the 
1982 recession. The only other business cycle accounting exercises of this sort that we 
are aware of, those of Chakraborty (2005) and Kobayashi and Inaba (2005) for Japan 
reach conflicting conclusions on the importance of the investment wedge in accounting 
for Japan’s lost decade, with Chakraborty concluding that the investment wedge played a 
major role, while Kobayashi and Inaba conclude that labor market distortions may have 
been the main source of the decade long stagnation of economic activity. It is interesting 
that we can get so much action so to speak from the efficiency wedge in isolation. All of 
the mid 1960s cycle can be accounted for by movements in this wedge alone, as can a 
significant part of the long cycle of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
  It is worth pausing to consider how well the wedges match up with either direct or 
indirect measures of labor and product market distortions. While changes in tax rates are 
(at least in principle) amenable to direct measurement, changes in other factors that might 
impact the size of these wedges, such as labor and product market regulation, are more 
difficult to measure. Such measures as do exist, such as those from the OECD’s 
regulatory reform project, typically do not have a very rich time series dimension. A 
more compelling case for taking these (labor) wedge estimates seriously is given by 
comparing the series with direct measures of marginal tax rates. There were significant 
changes in personal income taxes in Ireland during the 30-year period we look at here. 
OECD data show income tax payments (plus employee contributions to social insurance) 
falling from 29.2 percent of gross wages in 1995 for single persons without children to 
16.9 percent in 2001. (By comparison over the same period the tax burden went from 
25.8 percent to 24.6 percent in the US.) In 1980, the top rate of income tax was 60 
percent. There were five tax bands, with the top rate payable on income over £9,000. The 
top rate of taxation peaked at 65 percent in 1984/85 (payable on income over £10,000) 
and was steadily reduced to 44 percent in 2000.  
  14Of course statutory tax rates are not necessarily the rates that households and 
businesses are concerned about when making decisions about how much to work, 
consume, save and invest. Rather, what we need is information on the marginal tax rates 
faced by economic agents. Unfortunately information of this sort is hard to come by. To 
date, no one has attempted to compute average marginal tax rates for Ireland using the 
methods of Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986). Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) 
proposed a methodology for estimating average marginal tax rates for use in 
computational experiments using aggregate data from OECD National Accounts and Tax 
Statistics publications. The Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (hereinafter MRT) methodology 
has subsequently been adapted by the European Commission (Martinez-Mongay (2000)) 
and the OECD (Carey and Tchillinguirian (2000)) to produce alternative time series of 
tax rate for EU and OECD countries.  
  Figure 9 plots the wedge estimate computed above along with an estimate of the 
tax wedge based on the effective average tax rates in Martinez-Mongay (2000). The tax 
wedge is defined as 1(  where   is Martinez-Mongay’s estimate of 
the effective tax rate on consumption (his series CETR) and   is his estimate of the 
effective tax rate on labor income (his series LETR). Note that the increase in the labor 
wedge in the late 1970s and early 1980s is accompanied by an increase in the tax wedge.
1 ) / ( 1 )
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The two series are highly correlated with one another (correlation coefficient of 0.97). 
However, if we look at the movement in the two series relative to their levels in 1973, we 
find a much bigger increase in the estimated intratemporal tax wedge than we do in the 
intratemporal tax wedge.  
 
Conclusions 
  We argue that Ireland experienced a downturn in economic activity in the 1980s 
that was comparable to the Great Depression of the interwar period. We use the business 
cycle accounting approach of Chari Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) to study the episode 
and determine which wedges played the dominant role in the downturn and recovery. For 
the sake of comparison we also look at the milder downturn that the Irish economy 
 
8 Note that the Figure would look much the same if we were to replace our estimate of the tax wedge with 
Martinez-Mongay’s tax wedge on labor or tax wedge on employed labor.  
  15experienced during the mid 1960s. We find that in the great depression episode, the 
government and investment wedges in isolation would have predicted growth above 
trend, rather than the severe downturn that was actually observed. The efficiency wedge 
in isolation can account for much of the decline in output during the first decade of the 
depression, and also generates a recovery, albeit not as strong as the recovery observed in 
the data. The labor wedge acting in isolation would also have generated a severe 
downturn, but no recovery. In terms of accounting for the change in the labor input, only 
the labor wedge generates movements in the right direction.  
  We view the results in this paper as a first step towards a quantitative explanation 
of what happened in Ireland during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Regardless of whether 
the output decline satisfies the technical definition of a great depression as proposed by 
Kehoe and Prescott, there is no doubt that the downturn was severe, and that it is useful 
to try to explain the bust and boom as a single cyclical episode. Our study suggests many 
avenues for future research. To begin with, it is clear that Ireland was still engaged in a 
process of catch up in 1973 when the economy went into recession. It would also be 
useful to repeat the accounting exercise undertaken above to take account of the fact that 
Ireland was on a transitional growth path in 1973 when the downturn began, and see how 
robust our conclusions would be. Finally, it would be worthwhile investigating how well 
a basic extension of the model employed here can account for Ireland’s convergence 
experience over the past four decades or so.  
  
  16Data Appendix 
 
Per capita output 
 
≡ (GDP – Indirect taxes + Services from consumer durables + Depreciation from 
consumer durables) / Working age population 
 
GDP = GDP in constant market prices, millions of 1995 euro. Source: ESRI databank, 
series GDP.  
 
Indirect taxes = Total indirect taxes in constant prices, millions of 1995 euro. Source: 
ESRI databank, series TRE. 
 
Services from consumer durables = Assumed equal to 4 percent of the estimated stock of 
consumer durables. (Same as Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan (2005)). 
 
Stock of consumer durables = Estimated by cumulating the series CD (consumer 
spending on durables, millions of 1995 euro) from ESRI databank, with assumed annual 
depreciation rate of 16.5 percent. We obtain a starting value for the durables stock series 
by assuming that all purchases of consumer durables in 1953 were for replacement 
purposes. Note: Fraumeni (1997) reports depreciation rates used by the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis to measure the stock of consumer durables that range from 11.79 
percent (for furniture) to 61.77 percent for tires, tubes accessories and other parts. The 
16.5 percent depreciation rate is used for several categories of durables. 
 
Depreciation from consumer durables = Assumed equal to 16.5 percent of stock of 
consumer durables outstanding at the end of the previous year. 
 
Working age population = Population aged 15-64, thousands. Source: ESRI databank, 
series N1564.  
 
Per capita labor input 
 
≡ (Annual hours worked per person employed × Total employment / Working age 
population) / (50 weeks ×100 hours per week)  
 
Annual hours worked per person employed = Series Annual hours worked per person 
employed from  Groningen Growth and Development Centre and The Conference Board, 
Total Economy Database, January 2005, http://www.ggdc.net
 
Total employment = Total employment, thousands. Source: ESRI databank, series LTOT.  
 
Working age population = Population aged 15-64, thousands. Source: ESRI databank, 
series N1564.  
 
Per capita consumption 
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≡ (Consumption of nondurables and services – Sales tax × (1 – Share of consumer 
durables in total consumer spending) + Service flow from consumer durables + Net 
exports)/Working age population 
 
Consumption of nondurables and services = Consumption of nondurables and services in 
constant prices, millions of 1995 euro. Source: ESRI databank, series CND+CS. 
 
Service flow from stock of consumer durables = Assumed equal to 4 percent of the 
estimated stock of consumer durables. (Same as Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan (2005)). 
 
Working age population = Population aged 15-64, thousands. Source: ESRI databank, 
series N1564.  
 
Per capita investment 
 
≡ (Gross fixed investment + Private inventories + Personal consumption expenditure on 
durables – Sales tax × Share of consumer durables in total consumer spending) / Working 
age population 
 
Gross fixed investment = Gross domestic capital formation, millions of 1995 euro. 
Source: ESRI databank, series ITOT. 
 
Private inventories = Total value of physical changes in stocks,  millions of 1995 euro. 
Source: ESRI database, series STDL. 
 
Personal consumption expenditure on durables  = Consumption of durables including 
transportation equipment, millions of 1995 euro. Source: ESRI databank, series CD.  
 
Share of consumer durables in total consumer spending = CDV/(CDV+CNDV+CSV), 
where CDV = consumer spending on durables (millions of euro), CNDV = consumer 
spending on nondurables (millions of euro), and CSV = consumer spending on services 
(millions of euro), all from ESRI databank. 
 
Working age population = Population aged 15-64, thousands. Source: ESRI databank, 
series N1564.  
 
Note: Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan (2005) include net factor payments from abroad (GNP-
GDP) in their measure of investment. We opt to exclude them. 
 
Per capita government  
 
≡ (Government consumption + Net exports) / Working age population 
 
Government consumption = Government expenditure on current goods and services in 
constant prices, millions of 1995 euro. Source: ESRI databank, series GCG.  
  18 
Working age population = Population aged 15-64, thousands. Source: ESRI databank, 
series N1564.  
 
Net exports  = Net exports of goods and services in constant prices, millions of 1995 
euro. Source: ESRI databank, series XGS-MGS.  
 
Note: Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan (2005) include the trade balance in their measure of per 
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  25Figure 6 
Output 1965-1969 





















  26Figure 7 
Labor input 1965-1969 
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